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Abstract
“Anonymous purchasing” has been in use for about a decade. While we have been able to use anonymous purchasing to buy goods
and services from home based desk-top computers for many years, it has only been within the last few years that anonymous
purchasing has been used on a mobile platform. This has enabled the buyer to use anonymous purchasing almost anywhere such
as restaurants where it had not been possible before. Now shoppers can easily use their Wechat account for purchasing goods
using their mobile phone and do it anonymously. This has added to the privacy and security of the purchaser. This anonymity
in purchasing is increasingly being demanded by more people. In this paper the authors will examine an anonymous purchasing
system using digital signature techniques of cryptographic and mobile payment systems.
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1. Introduction
Many young people in China purchase goods and services online from popular websites such as meituan.com,
lashou.com, and diaping.com. On these websites, shoppers can purchase goods, services, entertainment and travel. In
the past, when shoppers made purchases on the internet, they would usually use a credit or debit card, which obviously,
has no anonymity. For some people this is fine, but a growing number of customers are demanding anonymous
purchasing because of spam and other security issues. More recently, shoppers are making purchases using e-cash
through “Wechat” (or the Chinese application “Weixin”). Wechat is an instant mobile messaging application that
is a Location Based Service (LBS) technology which provides a function called “Searching for the nearby”. These
applications have obvious privacy threats because users may send personal information to everyone surrounding them
through the wifi system. In this paper, the authors will examine an anonymous payment system, using a mobile
payment platform such asWechat, where three entities are used to keep the buyer anonymous and keep the information
secret: the purchaser, merchant, and issuer (usually the bank). These three entities are combined using verification
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codes, in such a way, as to keep the buyer’ information secret. Wechat, and other mobile systems, have been studied by
Gao and Ying on the iPhone1. Lien and Cao2 studied how shoppers use Wechat in China. Mao3 did a more detailed
study of purchasing patterns of Chinese undergraduate students using WeChat. There is some related literature about
mobile payment systems in4,5,6,7, but they are out of the scope of this article.
2. Analysis of Three Player Anonymous E-Cash Systems
2.1. System Overview
This purchasing system operates as follows: 1) Buyer transfers his cash to issuer (bank). 2) Issuer (bank) sends
receipt of cash to buyer. 3) Buyer uses e-cash in shop. 4) Seller checks the verification code by issuer (bank). 5)
Issuer transfers e-cash to shop. 6) Seller confirms this transaction with buyer.
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Veriﬁcation and Redeeming PhaseIssuing and Conversion Phase
Issuer
Shop
12
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Figure 1. The role of three parties
2.2. Security Issues
Why would a shopper choose anonymous purchasing? The following are some important reasons: 1) To prevent
the seller from collecting user data through transaction software such as the website. 2) It is confidential to purchaser.
3) To prevent advertising harassment. The main advantage of the system is that consumers remain anonymous because
they do not send any personal information over wifi or other public systems.
3. Our Methodology and Scheme
There are seven phases in our methodology: system initialization, e-cash conversion, fetching, purchasing, verifi-
cation, redemption and transaction confirmation. The following notations are used in this section:
Notations:
p: a large prime number where |p| is 1204 bits length.
g: an element primitive generator of Z∗p.
xi: the secret key.
yi: the public key.
h(.): a one-way hash function.
t: the e-cash.
m: money amount.
‖: concatenation. These phases are described in the following subsection.
3.1. System Initialization
During system initialization, the buyer randomly chooses a secret key xa to compute the public key ya; the seller
also randomly choose a secret key xb to compute the public key yb; the issuer randomly choose a secret key xc to
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compute the public key yc, where
ya ≡ gxa (mod p), (1)
yb ≡ gxb (mod p), (2)
yc ≡ gxc (mod p). (3)
The issuer agrees to share a secret parameter h(m‖t) with the seller. The h(m‖t) stores the money format and amount.
See Figure 2.
Buyer Issuer Shop
sa ≡ ya · ra mod p
yb ≡ g
xb mod pyc ≡ g
xc mod pya ≡ g
xa mod p
ra ≡ g
ka mod p
Figure 2. System Initialization Phase
3.2. Money Conversion
If the buyer wants to convert money to e-cash, ka is randomly selected to find
ra ≡ gka (mod p) (4)
sa ≡ ya · ra (mod p). (5)
sa is sent to the issuer, see Figure 3.
Buyer Issuer
1. {sa}
Figure 3. Money Conversion Phase
3.3. E-cash Fetching Phase
The issuer receives sa (money) from buyer. A secret key xc is used to compute T , where
T ≡ sxca · h(m‖t) (mod p), (6)
and feedback e-cash (T ) to the buyer. When the buyer receives the e-cash (T ), it is stored in the mobile device, see
Figure 4.
Buyer Issuer
2. {T} T ≡ s
xc
a
· h(m‖t) mod p
Figure 4. E-cash fetching phase
3.4. E-cash Using Phase
Upon receiving T , the buyer can use his e-cash to buy something from the merchant. Note: The buyer must keep
the T . It is usually stored in the mobile phone or computer. In practice, the T is a voucher code, serial code or an
electronic record, see Figure 5.
3.5. E-cash Verification Phase
When the shop obtains e-cash (T ) from the buyer, the shop can check the validation code. The seller uses the secret
key xb to compute
T ′ ≡ (T )xb · h(m‖t)−xb (mod p), (7)
and sends T ′ to issuer, see Figure 6.
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Buyer Shop
3. {T}
Figure 5. E-cash using phase
Issuer Shop
T
′
≡ (T )xb · h(m‖t)−xb mod p4. {T ′}
Figure 6. E-cash verification phase
3.6. Money Redeeming Phase
Issuer receives serial code T ′ to verify e-cash from seller, shop used x−1c to find verified serial code T ′′ where:
T ′′ ≡ (T ′)x
−1
c (mod p). (8)
Issuer returns verified serial code T ′′ to seller. If verified, the sellers and buyers are legal users, see Figure 7.
Issuer Shop
5. {T ′′}T
′′
≡ (T ′)x
−1
c mod p
Figure 7. Money redeeming phase
3.7. Transaction Confirming Phase
Seller receives verified serial code T ′′ from issuer, seller used x−1b to find
T ′′′ ≡ (T ′′)x
−1
b (mod p), (9)
and then returns receipt T ′′′ to buyer. Upon on receiving T ′′′, buyer can verify
sa
?
≡ T ′′′ (mod p), (10)
If it is verified, the transaction is completed, see Figure 8.
Buyer Shop
6. {T ′′′} T
′′′
≡ (T ′′)x
−1
b mod p
Figure 8. Transaction confirming phase
Proof.
s′a
?
≡ T ′′′ mod p
≡ [T ′′]x
−1
b mod p
≡ [[T ′]x
−1
c ]x
−1
b mod p
≡ [[(T )xb · h(m‖t)−xb]x−1c ]x−1b mod p
≡ [[((ya · ra)xc · h(m‖t))xb · h(m‖t)−xb]x
−1
c ]x
−1
b mod p
≡ sa mod p. (11)
The detailed scheme shows on Figure 9.
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Figure 9. The progress of our scheme
3.8. Security Analysis
The purchaser’s information is anonymous when the system uses a one-way hash function8, this function has
several properties, two of which are pre-image resistance and collision resistance.
Scenario 1: If attacker wants to find the xa or ka from the known ya or ra, modulus p and generator g, he would
challenge the discrete logarithm problem.
Scenario 2: Only buyer compute ya since he owns his secret key xa, where ya ≡ gxa (mod p), even if the sa and the
ya are published, anybody may find ra ≡ y−1a · sa (mod p) by Equation (5). Buyer transferred his e-cash upon on the
sa to T since sa be linked to ya and ra; buyer just announced his ya, he does not publish ra. Hence, no one can trace
and modify any information, the buyer’s identity is still anonymity.
Scenario 3: The issuer can not deny his identifier behavior by Equation (6). The issuer signed sa using his private
key xc and a secret share parameter h(m‖t) to obtain the warrant T . Namely, the voucher code or verification code.
Scenario 4: The seller can not mutually deny his action. Since T ′ is produced by the shop, although the seller does
not know xc and sa, but he could use xb to find T ′ and return to issuer. If T ′ is incorrect, the issuer can not recovery
T ′′ from T ′. Therefore, the seller and issuer also can not deny each others. See Equation (7) and Equation (8).
4. Conclusion
In this paper the authors have proposed a scheme to provide security for a mobile purchaser so that the consumer
does not have to be concerned about leaking any sensitive data on a public network. On a mobile purchasing system,
users usually store the serial code T (cash) in their mobile phone, which presents a security problem. We solved this
problem by the use of serial and verification codes thus improving the eﬃciency and security of the mobile anonymous
system.
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